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One of the first things you notice about Elizabeth Holmes is that she rarely blinks. As she reels off pat answers to warm-up questions in the first few minutes of HBO鈥檚 new documentary , it is hard to look away from her wide open eyes.
What do you dream will happen by 2025? 鈥淭hat less people will have to say goodbye too soon to people that they love.鈥 Holmes nods when she speaks. You find yourself nodding with her.
Which makes what happens next more striking. 鈥淐an you tell us a secret?鈥 asks the interviewer. The eyes break away from the camera. Blink, blink, blink. It is 7听seconds before Holmes answers, eyes down. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 have many secrets, um鈥…鈥娾
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Tracking Theranos in numbers
The rise and fall of her company Theranos (a mash-up of 鈥渢herapy鈥 and 鈥渄iagnosis鈥) can be told in numbers. She founded it in 2003 aged 19, dropping out of Stanford University in California. Over the next decade, she raised nearly $900听million from investors. At its peak, Theranos was valued at nearly $10听billion, and Holmes, in her 20s, owned more than half.
The company claimed to have invented blood-testing tech that could diagnose 200 conditions in a few minutes from a pinprick of blood from a finger tip.
Walgreens, the second-largest pharmacy chain in the US, installed Theranos blood-testing booths in about 40 of its stores.
But most tests never worked. A former employee听 said that if 100 people had syphilis, only 65 tested positive. In the end, only one of the 200 tests was cleared by US regulators for use. When a exposed the gap between the wild claims and reality, Theranos unleashed its lawyers. One whistle-blower鈥檚 family faced having to sell their home to cover legal fees.
Holmes couldn鈥檛 outrun the truth, though. By 2017, Theranos had burned through nearly a billion dollars, a third on lawyers, settling lawsuits with investors and refunding every patient who took one of its blood tests. In 2018, Holmes and company president Sunny Balwani were indicted on nine counts of fraud. They say they aren’t guilty, the trial is pending, and Theranos has closed down.
So smart, so dumb
How could so many smart people have been duped for so long? From the outset, she signed听 impressive investors, including media mogul Rupert Murdoch and the founder of computer giant Oracle, despite having nothing to show them. Channing Robertson, head of science at Stanford,听 was recruited as an advisor 鈥 and the first board member. Her board of directors included Henry Kissinger, and she made friends with Bill Clinton.
Journalist Ken Auletta talked to many of these people for a New Yorker profile of Holmes. He was struck by how they spoke of her: 鈥淚t was quite amazing to spend time with these people. They were talking about her as if she was Beethoven.鈥 Kissinger told Auletta that Holmes had an ethereal quality, and compared her to a member of a monastic order.
Holmes certainly presented herself as an ascetic, telling journalists her apartment was the size of a mattress, that her fridge contained only bottled water and she slept for just 4听hours a night.
But she was just very good at convincing people. In a bravura performance at a Wall Street Journal conference, she defended her company against the paper鈥檚 allegations. Theranos seemed to be collapsing, yet most investors and advisors stood by her.
The Inventor places Holmes in a line of entrepreneurs who wanted to change the world, suggesting little more than that she may have drunk too much of her own Kool-Aid. True, Holmes located her start-up in a corner of Silicon Valley where Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk made their names. She even wore Jobs-style black turtlenecks.
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The Edison connection
But the film also traces her lineage to Edison (the other 鈥渋nventor鈥 in the film鈥檚 title), presenting him as 鈥渢he first celebrity businessman鈥. Eerily, Holmes named her prototype blood-testing machine 鈥淓dison鈥.
The real Edison also pretended things worked when they didn鈥檛. He sold people on his light bulb before he鈥檇 made one, faking demos and giving sceptical journalists shares in his company. The film cites one of his most famous quotes: 鈥淥ur greatest weakness lies in giving up. The most certain way to succeed is always to try just one more time.鈥 It鈥檚 the stuff of bad posters, but among Silicon Valley鈥檚 wannabe billionaires, such self-belief borders on the delusional.
Did Edison know he was going to succeed and was buying time until he did? Is this what Holmes did听鈥 or thought she was doing?
Then the tech didn’t work…
Her self-belief must have been catching. Walgreens signed with Theranos before it had any results.听 Had Walgreens visited Theranos, as employees explain in the film, it would have found broken parts, exploded centrifuges and mechanisms gummed with sticky blood, and people working mostly with blood from untested volunteers, scared of hepatitis.
Many employees knew Holmes鈥檚 machine couldn鈥檛 be built. As one says: 鈥淵ou can鈥檛 just bend your way around the laws of physics. You can鈥檛 just have a great marketing campaign and get around these things.鈥 If they told senior management, they would be told 鈥渕aybe you鈥檙e not a Silicon Valley person鈥.
Ian Gibbons, Theranos鈥檚 chief scientist,was pushed out. Facing a legal battle involving the company, he took his own life. According to his widow, the only time the company contacted her after his death was to request she return his confidential files.
The film shows how Holmes and Balwani created a culture of paranoia. Holmes had bulletproof glass installed in her office and hired personal bodyguards. Employees realised their emails were being read when they didn鈥檛 copy in Balwani or Holmes, and still got a response from Balwani.
Holmes said the high security was to protect trade secrets. But it was probably justified for other reasons. Employees quoted in the film say Theranos was engaging in dubious practices, including using commercially available machines to analyse patients鈥 blood.
To stall for time, Theranos flooded investigators from the US Food and Drug Administration with information, and sent the US agency in charge of clinical labs only data from the commercially available machines.
What was Holmes thinking?
We still don鈥檛 know what Holmes was thinking. It was not a cold-blooded scam, says one whistle-blower. 鈥淚t started off as one lie and snowballed.鈥
Perhaps the film鈥檚 best insight comes from Dan Ariely at Duke University in North Carolina. He describes an experiment where he asks people to roll dice, telling them they will get paid what the die face shows if it is the number they were thinking of. Of course people lie听鈥 as playing hooked up to a lie detector confirms. If the money is going to charity, players still lie but defeat the lie detector. 鈥淚f it鈥檚 for a good cause, you can still think of yourself as a good person,鈥 says Ariely.
But can a dice game explain a decade of deceit? Holmes鈥檚 secrets may emerge in court. But when it comes to it, for all its insight, The Inventor leaves us with the same questions it started with.
听, directed by Alex Gibney, HBO听
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