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By the time Iraq’s nuclear factories were bombed in February, they had
succeeded in enriching small quantities of uranium using electromagnetic
dev ices called calutrons. Iraq worked on calutrons for up to two years,
and could have produced as much as 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
in that time, according to a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

While now admitting to having built calutrons, Iraq claims that it produced
only half a kilogram of uranium that was 4 per cent enriched. Weapons-grade
uranium is enriched to at least 90 per cent, which means that 90 per cent
of the uranium is in the form of the lighter isotope uranium-235.

Iraq’s lower figure may be accurate, says IAEA officials, but few are
willing to take it on trust. IAEA inspectors are now searching for supplies
of depleted uranium, from which uranium-235 has been extracted. These would
prove that Iraq produced more enriched uranium than it admits.

The experimental calutrons were probably housed in a building at the
Tuwaitha nuclear centre called the Nuclear Physics Laboratories, says the
IAEA. Bombs destroyed much of this building, and the Iraqis then cleared
and levelled the site. This ‘suggests an attempt to render difficult the
identification and purposes of these buildings’, the report notes.

The existence of Iraq’s calutrons took Western intelligence agencies
by surprise when they came to light some months ago (This Week, 29 June).
One of the first hints came from uranium residues detected on the clothes
of American hostages who were held at the Tuwaitha centre. The residues
contained the ‘signature’ of calutrons, a US official said.

The nature of this ‘signature’ is highly classified. But according to
David Albright, a researcher on nonproliferation for Friends of the Earth,
traces of uranium chloride or uranium compounds with an extremely low concentration
of uranium-235 would have been valuable clues. Only calutrons use uranium
tetrachloride in the enrichment process, and most other processes do not
produce highly depleted uranium in a single step, as calutrons do.

Iraq probably intended to set up large-scale production of enriched
uranium in two massive factories north of Baghdad, says David Kyd, a spokesman
for the IAEA. Inspectors from the IAEA finally took possession of these
sites last week after an unprecedented cloak-and-dagger foray into the desert.
The factories, which were heavily damaged by bombs, were about 80 per cent
complete, according to Kyd, and could have started operating in 6 to 18
months.

These facilities, located at Tarmiyah and Al-Sharqat, were served by
enormous 100-megawatt power supplies, 25-tonne cranes, and supplies of chilled
and purified water. According to the IAEA’s report, each of them could have
held about 100 calutrons. These two factories might eventually have produced
enough uranium each year for several bombs.

Iraq has declared that it possessed 40 of the devices, and has turned
over various pieces of damaged calutrons to the IAEA. But many of the devices
were destroyed by allied bombing, and others may have been removed by the
Iraqis. During one futile visit to Tarmiyah, IAEA inspectors outside a security
fence watched heavy equipment being loaded onto trucks and driven away.

According to Kyd, the Iraqi army is still shuttling these trucks around
the country ‘from barracks to barracks’. On several occasions, inspectors
have encountered these convoys on the road; shots were fired when they began
taking photographs.

Specialists in nuclear nonproliferation have been shocked that Iraq
could succeed in developing a home-grown enrichment programme, and worry
that other nations could follow its example. Although calutrons are extremely
expensive to operate, their components and technology are far easier to
acquire or develop than other enrichment processes, such as centrifuges.

‘This has sent shivers down the spines of people who thought that export
controls alone could solve the proliferation problem,’ says Albright. While
export controls remain important, they should be accompanied by political
efforts to ‘delegitimise’ nuclear weapons, Albright believes. These might
include restricting their development in nuclear-armed nations, a worldwide
ban on nuclear testing, and an arms-control agreement in the Middle East
that included Israel’s nuclear stockpile.

But US officials do not appear as worried by Iraq’s example. ‘Within
the government, there’s some amusement at the hand wringing that’s going
on,’ said one. His view is that Iraq was in a unique position, with almost
unlimited supplies of cash and electrical power. Other nations, he said,
would have difficulty following a similar path.